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BUILDING A TRADEMARK SAFE HARBOR 
FOR CONTRIBUTORY COUNTERFEITING 
LIABILITY AFTER TIFFANY V. EBAY 
JILLIAN DE CHAVEZ† 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 26, 2008, New York City law enforcement 
agents raided thirty-two shops in Chinatown’s “Counterfeit 
Triangle,” hauling away over $1 million in fake merchandise that 
included counterfeit Tiffany, Gucci, and Coach items.1  As a 
matter of law, those who knowingly used a counterfeit trademark 
in connection with a sale or distribution were subject to treble 
damages,2 in addition to ex parte seizure, as illustrated in this 
instance.3  The resulting case settled recently, in April 2010.4  In 
the interim, the city’s actions prevented the sale of counterfeit 
goods from those shuttered storefronts.5  
Subsequent comments by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and 
other officials illustrate how counterfeiting’s harmful effects on 
trademark owners, consumers, and society justify aggressive 
action.  Counterfeiting, the most egregious form of trademark 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; Candidate for J.D., 2012, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2008, New York University. I would like to 
extend special thanks to Professor Joseph Gagliano for his invaluable advice, 
feedback, and encouragement. 
1 Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Announces Cash 
Payment that Settles “Counterfeit Triangle” Case Brought by the Office of Special 
Enforcement (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/portal/ 
site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0/index.jsp?pageID=mayor
_press_release&catID=1194&doc_name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2
Fom%2Fhtml%2F2010a%2Fpr145-10.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1 
[hereinafter Press Release]. 
2 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006 Supp. & II 2008).  
3 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2006 Supp. & II 2008).  
4 Press Release, supra note 1. Under that settlement, the shop owners agreed to 
pay the city $800,000 in fines and to use the space for legitimate business purposes. 
Id.  
5 Id. 
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infringement,6 “deprives legitimate businesses of customers,” 
said Mayor Bloomberg in an April 2010 press release.7  
Trademarks, which embody a company’s quality and goodwill8 
and enable the owner to compete in the marketplace,9 are an 
important business asset.10  Counterfeiting diminishes the 
trademark’s value and the owner’s business when lesser-quality 
goods are associated with the mark.11  Consumers are harmed 
when they pay for something that does not live up to the mark’s 
reputation for good quality.12  Such inferior goods can also 
endanger consumers’ safety or health when the product does not 
perform as expected.13  Finally, according to John Feinblatt, 
Chief Advisor to the Mayor for Policy and Strategic Planning, 
“[s]elling counterfeit goods is a form of organized crime.”14 
Counterfeiting diverts substantial amounts of money from the  
 
 
 
 
6 See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984, 
S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 2, 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, 3628, 3630 
(discussing the serious nature of counterfeiting activities). 
7 Press Release, supra note 1. 
8 See, e.g., E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 518 (6th 
Cir. 1943) (explaining that one goal of trademark law is to protect the good will 
symbolized by the trademark, allowing owners “to build up businesses around 
names by which articles are known.”); see also infra note 48. 
9 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (“Trade-
marks . . . are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice 
between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the 
other.”). 
10 See Anthony F. Lo Cicero et al., Intellectual Property Issues, in ACQUIRING OR 
SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 2011, at 203, 207 (PLI Corporate Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1885, 2011) (“The goodwill associated with 
certain trade names or trademarks may . . . be of substantial value . . . .”). 
11 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995). 
12 See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:5 (4th ed. 2011). 
13 See id.; see also INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ENFORCEMENT 4 (2010) (“Counterfeit products can pose a significant risk to public 
health, such as toothpaste with dangerous amounts of diethylene glycol . . . auto 
parts of unknown quality that play critical roles in securing passengers and suspect 
semiconductors used in life-saving defibrillators.”) [hereinafter JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN]; TRADEMARK LAW & THE INTERNET: ISSUES, CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE TIPS 
144 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield eds., 2d ed. 2001). 
14 Press Release, supra note 1. 
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domestic and international economy15 to fund numerous illegal 
enterprises such as sweatshops, child labor, money laundering, 
violent gang activity, and terrorism.16  
Indeed, counterfeiting is not just a New York City problem.  
It is well established that the harmful effects of counterfeiting on 
trademark owners, consumers, and society as a whole are very 
serious national and international problems.17  Because of this, 
the United States takes an aggressive stance against 
counterfeiting, enacting laws that punish counterfeiters and 
those who assist them with ex parte seizures,18 destruction of 
counterfeit merchandise upon seizures,19 treble damages,20 hefty 
fines,21 and imprisonment.22 
There are harsh penalties for counterfeiting, but their 
effectiveness is greatly diminished if counterfeiters can easily 
avoid detection—a more difficult problem on the Internet than in 
the physical world.23  Offline, there is a physical location to 
investigate and raid, counterfeit merchandise to seize, and at 
least some of the individuals participating in the counterfeiting 
are present.  Ex parte seizures happen swiftly so that the 
counterfeiter cannot destroy the evidence or escape by relocating 
before the goods are seized.24  In some cases, seizing the 
 
15 See ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 2-5 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.19(1) (2011); 
About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTICOUNTERFEITING COALITION, http://www.iacc.org/ 
about-counterfeiting/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (estimating the cost of global 
counterfeiting to be $600 billion per year; in the United States alone, counterfeiting 
costs legitimate American industries between $200 and $250 billion annually and 
about 750,000 jobs). 
16 See PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY, AND 
THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 22–23 (1999). 
17 See supra notes 15–16. 
18 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).  
19 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (indicating that treble damages 
may be either of profits or damages, whichever is greater).  
21 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); see also United States v. Foote, 
413 F.3d 1240, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s fine of more 
than $104,000 for defendant’s trafficking in counterfeit goods). 
22 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
23 See Thomas Fedorek, Computers + Connectivity = New Opportunities for 
Criminals and Dilemmas for Investigators, N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb. 2004, at 10, 10 (“The 
anonymity afforded by cyberspace decreases, to a significant degree, the criminal’s 
risk of detection and capture, and increases, to an equally significant degree, the 
difficulty of investigating cybercrimes. The evanescence of digital evidence stymies 
traditional methods of search and seizure.”). 
24 GILSON, supra note 15, at § 5.19 (4)(b)(i). 
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counterfeit goods is enough to shut down the illegal business.25  
But online, there is no physical place to raid, no immediate and 
observable hand-to-hand exchange of cash and goods.  On the 
Internet, people can buy counterfeit goods from anywhere in the 
world.  Transactions happen instantly.  The Internet also tends 
to anonymize counterfeiters so that they are harder to catch than 
their offline counterparts.26  If a seller of counterfeit merchandise 
suspects action will be taken against him, the anonymity of the 
Internet makes it easy for him to assume new online identities 
and sell items on other websites, such as Craigslist, that have 
few registration requirements.27  Current anti-counterfeiting 
measures lose much of their bite if counterfeiters are more 
difficult to find.  The same ease, speed, and far-reaching 
communication capabilities that facilitate countless lawful 
business transactions over the Internet also make it very 
challenging and costly for trademark owners—especially owners 
of high-end, luxury marks28— to police their brands.29  
A recent set of cases in which eBay defended against several 
trademark owners’ allegations of contributory trademark 
infringement illustrates one response from trademark owners—
target the online service providers that hosted counterfeiting 
activity under the theory of contributory trademark infringement 
and force them to take more action against counterfeiting on 
their websites.30  The facts of Tiffany v. eBay,31 Hermes v. eBay,32 
 
25 See Ann Hiaring Hocking, Basic Principles of Trademark Law, in 
UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 2011, at 85, 115 
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 
1054, 2011) (“Since many counterfeit operations are structured to create quick 
profits form [sic] a short-lived business, the seizure provisions allow trademark 
holders to strike quickly at the heart of the illicit operation, effectively shutting it 
down.”). 
26 Scott Gelin & G. Roxanne Elings, Contributory Liability for Trademark 
Counterfeiting in an Ecommerce World, JIPEL, jipel.law.nyu.edu/2010/04/ 
contributory-liability-for-trademark-counterfeiting-in-an-ecommerce-world/ (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2012). 
27 Id. 
28 See Katherine C. Spelman, What’s New in Anti-Counterfeiting, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE 2010, at 379, 383 (PLI Intellectual Prop., 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 1022, 2010).  
29 See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 647. 
30 See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: 
The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1365–66 (2006). 
31 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 96. 
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and LVMH v. eBay33 were virtually the same: an owner of a high-
end, luxury trademark found significant amounts of counterfeit 
merchandise being sold on eBay, then sued on the grounds that 
eBay had some level of awareness of infringement on its website, 
requiring eBay to take more action than it already did.  The 
American and French courts arrived at divergent conclusions.  
The Second Circuit’s decision in Tiffany v. eBay reflects the 
American approach to contributory trademark infringement, 
which currently favors online marketplaces like eBay.34  First, 
the court held that an online marketplace’s “general knowledge” 
of infringement on its website is not enough to trigger liability.35  
Second, a prompt take-down of allegedly counterfeit listings, 
through eBay’s Verified Owners Rights (“VeRO”)36 program, 
adequately addressed trademark infringement on the site.37  The 
Second Circuit essentially applied copyright safe-harbor 
reasoning from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 
to find that eBay’s efforts excluded it from liability.38  eBay, 
however, was less successful in France.  Although eBay 
presented these same efforts in its defense in the Hermes and 
LVMH cases, and despite a statutory framework similar to the 
American common law standard for contributory trademark 
infringement, the French courts ruled against eBay.39  In both 
French cases, eBay was perceived as having the requisite degree 
of knowledge to trigger liability.40  The French courts named 
specific steps that eBay should have taken that would have 
limited its liability, such as requiring users to provide 
 
32 Hermes Int’l v. Feitz, Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of 
original jurisdiction] Troyes, June 4, 2008, Docket No. 06/02604 (Fr.), translation 
available at http://www.law.pace.edu/files/pilr/AllCasesTranslated.pdf [hereinafter 
Hermes case]. 
33 SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay, Inc., Tribunal de Commerce [T. Com.] 
[Commercial Court of Paris] Paris, June 30, 2008, First Section B, Docket No. 
2006077799 (Fr.), translation available at http://www. 
sunsteinlaw.com/media/FrenchOpinions.pdf [hereinafter LVMH case]. 
34 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103; see also Elizabeth K. Levin, Note, A Safe Harbor for 
Trademark: Reevaluating Secondary Trademark Liability after Tiffany v. eBay, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 494 (2009). 
35 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107, 109 (requiring specific knowledge of infringement or 
willful blindness to trigger liability for contributory trademark infringement).  
36 See infra Part II.A.1. 
37 See infra Part II.A.2. 
38 See infra Part II.A.1. 
39 See infra Part II.B. 
40 See infra Part II.B. 
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information about the product’s authenticity.41  The effect of the 
ruling was that online marketplaces like eBay have a duty to 
take preemptive steps to fight trademark infringement on these 
websites; a reactive mechanism such as the one approved by the 
Second Circuit was inadequate.42  These divergent decisions 
highlight competing policy concerns about assessing an online 
marketplace’s role in contributory trademark infringement and 
deciding the site’s exposure to liability.  
Since current anti-counterfeiting tools are not easily applied 
to the Internet, thereby diminishing their effectiveness, this Note 
argues that compensating for this deficiency requires legal 
provisions that encourage online service providers to implement 
both proactive and reactive anti-counterfeiting measures.  After 
Tiffany, e-commerce businesses in the United States are only 
required to react appropriately to counterfeiting on their 
websites.  Though it is well-settled that trademark owners must 
police their own brand,43 the Tiffany decision makes it extremely 
difficult and costly for owners to combat counterfeiting on their 
own.  Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s application of a reactive 
law written specifically for secondary copyright infringement on 
the Internet does not effectively address the entire temporal 
range of harm posed by trademark infringement.44  Part I 
discusses the goals and policies underlying American trademark 
law and explains where counterfeiting fits in this framework.  
This Part also traces the development of the judicially-created 
doctrine of contributory trademark law and how it has been 
applied in counterfeiting cases.  Part II compares the American 
approach to contributory trademark infringement to that of 
European courts.  Part III analyzes and assesses how each 
approach addresses the harms of contributory trademark 
infringement on the Internet.  Part IV proposes a legislative 
solution similar to the safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA, but 
tailored to the specific goals, policies, and harms faced by 
trademark owners.  While the Second Circuit properly decided 
that a notice-and-takedown procedure is one effective way to 
 
41 See infra Part II.B. 
42 See infra Part II.B. 
43 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“[R]ights holders bear the principal responsibility to police their 
trademarks.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 
S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
44 See infra Parts I.A. & IV.B. 
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combat trademark infringement on the Internet, it is a reactive 
mechanism that does not effectively address harms to 
trademarks owners and consumers that accrue even before 
someone buys a counterfeit item.  For this reason, a safe-harbor 
provision for trademark law should incentivize online 
marketplaces like eBay to take preventive action against 
trademark infringement.  
I. THE GOALS OF TRADEMARK LAW AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE 
A. The Goals of Trademark Law 
Because the overarching goal of trademark law is to foster 
competition,45 and the information conveyed by trademarks46 is 
useful and valuable to owners and consumers47 in the 
marketplace, the standard for trademark infringement is based 
on the concept of confusion.48  Thus, federal law imposes civil and 
 
45 Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark 
Use”, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 376 (2006). 
46 “A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a 
combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person’s goods or services 
and that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and 
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others. A service mark is a 
trademark that is used in connection with services.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (2011). Trademarks communicate information to 
consumers to help them decide purchases and prevent confusion. See Dan L. Burk, 
Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 699–700 
(1998) (“Consumers . . . use the mark as a signal of the quality of goods, expecting 
that goods branded with the mark will be of the quality they have come to associate 
with past purchases bearing the mark.”). Trademarks are a symbol of the good will 
associated with the owner’s products or services. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2011). 
Trademarks are also symbols of the owner’s investment of time, energy, and money 
into the brand. Courtenay Brian Allen, Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc.: 
Defining Use of a Mark and the Source of Confusion in Trademark Infringement, 49 
BAYLOR L. REV. 847, 856 (1997). 
47 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1995) 
(“[T]rademark law . . . reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making 
purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that [the 
trademarked item] is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items 
that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure 
a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, 
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.” (citations omitted)). 
48 Lanham Act § 43(a) prohibits “use[] in commerce” of a mark “on or in 
connection with any goods or services” that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the 
infringer’s] goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006); 
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criminal liability on those who use counterfeit marks that are 
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”49  
Confusion can occur at the point of sale, but also before or after a 
sale is made.  Point-of-sale confusion is when an actual consumer 
is confused about the source or origin of a product or service.50  
This is different from post-sale confusion, when an observer sees 
someone with an infringing item and mistakenly attributes it to 
the trademark owner.51  Another possibility is pre-sale confusion, 
which occurs when a plaintiff’s trademark is used to initiate 
contact with a prospective buyer.52  In the case of pre-sale 
confusion, a defendant can be liable even though the buyer is no 
longer confused at the time of purchase.53  
Together, the concepts of point-of-sale, post-sale, and pre-
sale confusion reflect trademark law’s goal of protecting both 
consumers and trademark owners.54  As such, each doctrine’s 
response to the injurious effects of misleading information differs 
 
see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946) (describing the policies promoted by the 
Lanham Act: (1) to prevent consumer confusion, (2) to protect the goodwill of 
businesses, and (3) to promote competition within the market). 
49 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006); see also 18 U.S.C § 2320(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 
2008).  
50 Marshall Leaffer, Sixty Years of the Lanham Act: The Decline and Demise of 
Monopoly Phobia, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 85, 126 (Hugh 
Hansen ed., 2006). 
51 Id. at 128; see also Acxiom Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. 
Del. 1998) (“[T]he senior user’s potential purchasers or ongoing customers might 
mistakenly associate the inferior quality work of the junior user with the senior user 
and, therefore, refuse to deal with the senior user in the future.”); Payless 
Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  
52 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 
1987) (explaining that pre-sale confusion arises “not in the fact that a third party 
would do business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil, but rather 
in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial credibility during the 
initial phases of a deal”). Other examples of how pre-sale confusion harms 
trademark owners can be seen in cases involving domain names. See, e.g., Dorr-
Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1996); Brookfield 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 
1999) (initial interest confusion is when one party has used another’s mark “in a 
manner calculated to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale 
is finally completed as a result of the confusion,” and “the fact that there is only 
initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that [defendant] would be 
misappropriating [plaintiff’s] acquired goodwill”); see also Leaffer, supra note 50, at 
129. Pre-sale confusion is also referred to as initial interest confusion. See 
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 23:6. 
53 Leaffer, supra note 50, at 129. 
54 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 n.14 (1982) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946)).  
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slightly, depending on when that confusion occurs.  When 
analyzing point-of-sale confusion, the focus is on purchasers.55  
Trademarks facilitate information that enables purchasers to 
make informed decisions about which products to purchase.56  
When used properly, a trademark quickly tells the consumer 
which company the product comes from, suggesting the product’s 
quality and distinguishing it from competing brands.57  Over 
time, consumers may come to infer the trademark’s reputation 
and goodwill.58  Counterfeiting creates confusion about this kind 
of information, which is costly and inefficient for consumers.59  
Consumers needlessly spend money when they buy an inferior 
product because they have confused it for another.60  In some 
cases, such confusion has human health costs when the product 
does not perform as expected, or has unexpected side effects.61 
Pre- and post-sale confusion doctrines address harms that 
are not adequately addressed by the consumer-oriented focus of 
point-of-sale confusion.62  Even where there is no confusion about 
the purchased product,63 courts recognize that confusion before 
and after the sale detracts from the efforts of rightful owners to 
market and protect their brand.64 Such confusion damages a 
trademark’s reputation and goodwill.65  As such, protecting their 
trademarks allows owners to reap the benefits of their work 
while excluding free riders from profiting from a trademark they 
had no role in creating.66  
 
55 General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 355 (6th 
Cir. 2006). 
56 See supra note 46. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See Burk, supra note 46, at 702–03. 
60 See supra note 46. 
61 MCCARTHY, supra note 12. 
62 Leaffer, supra note 50, at 128–30. 
63 Confusion is not the only reason why people buy counterfeit products. There is 
a market to feed people’s desire for cheaper counterfeits to use as status symbols. 
See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status 
Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 
1393, 1398 (2005). 
64 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 23:5–23:6. 
65 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.14 (1982) (“By 
applying a trademark to goods produced by one other than the trademark’s owner, 
the infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and 
money to obtain.”); see also Leaffer, supra note 50, at 129. 
66 LEE WILSON, THE TRADEMARK GUIDE: A FRIENDLY GUIDE TO PROTECTING 
AND PROFITING FROM TRADEMARKS 3 (2004). 
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As discussed previously, the Internet can exacerbate harms 
to both consumers and trademark owners caused by 
infringement;67 but, in addition, the Internet has made it 
especially difficult for trademark owners to police their brands 
online.  Trademark owners find that the online marketplace can 
stand in their way as they try to reach direct infringers who have 
used those Internet services.68  In response, trademark owners 
have gone after the online marketplace under theories of 
secondary liability.69   
B. The Evolution of Contributory Trademark Infringement  
Because chasing after direct counterfeiters on the Internet 
has been extremely difficult and costly, trademark owners have 
turned their attention to online service providers by suing them 
under the theory of contributory trademark infringement.  
Although the Lanham Act specifically addresses direct 
trademark infringement and not contributory trademark 
infringement,70 the Supreme Court recognized contributory 
trademark infringement as a cause of action in Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.71  As discussed in this 
Section, subsequent cases extended the act’s application, so that 
it now includes trademark-counterfeiting cases. 
Initially, the Inwood standard for contributory trademark 
infringement applied only to manufacturers and distributors of 
products.  In Inwood, the owner of a trademarked drug sued a 
generic manufacturer for “induc[ing] pharmacists illegally to 
substitute a generic drug for [the trademarked drug] and to 
mislabel the substitute drug” as the trademarked drug.72  The 
defendant had supplied its own drugs to pharmacies, which 
 
67 TRADEMARK LAW & THE INTERNET: ISSUES, CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE TIPS, 
supra note 13, at 142. 
68 See Ellie Mercado, Note, As Long As “It” Is Not Counterfeit: Holding eBay 
Liable for Secondary Trademark Infringement in the Wake of LVMH and Tiffany 
Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 115, 116–18 (2010); Virginia Welch, Comment, 
Contributory Trademark Infringement: Who Bears the Burden of Policing Online 
Counterfeit Activity?, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 361, 364 (2010). 
69 See infra Part I.B.  
70 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 647 (“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine 
that derives from the common law of torts.”). 
71 456 U.S. 844, 860 (1982) (White, J., concurring). 
72 Id. at 850 (majority opinion). 
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looked very similar to the plaintiffs’.73  Pharmacies then used the 
generic drug in place of the trademarked drug.74  The Supreme 
Court set forth the following standard:  A party is liable for 
contributory trademark infringement “if a manufacturer or 
distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a 
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement.”75  The second part of the Inwood test allows 
trademark owners to hold financially sound parties accountable 
in addition to or in place of the direct infringer.76  It is also easier 
for trademark owners to seek redress; suing one manufacturer or 
distributor is easier and perhaps more effective than suing each 
direct infringer separately.77 
A set of cases involving counterfeit goods then extended the 
application of the second Inwood scenario to parties with a 
degree of supervision over the persons and activities taking place 
on physical marketplaces.  Under the reasoning of Hard Rock 
Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.,78 flea market 
owners could be held liable for contributory trademark 
infringement.  In that case, Hard Rock Café sued Concession 
Services Inc. (“CSI”) after learning that a flea market vendor was 
selling counterfeit shirts on space provided by CSI.79  Noting that 
trademark infringement is rooted in tort principles governing 
landlord or licensor liability,80 and that Inwood imposed similar 
duties on manufacturers and distributors, the court found that 
 
73 Id. at 846–47. 
74 See id. at 851–53. 
75 Id. at 854. 
76 Fara S. Sunderji, Note, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory 
Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. 
Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 920 (2005). 
77 See Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Obtaining 
an injunction against each and every [direct infringer] would be infeasible. 
Trademark owners cannot hire investigators to shop every retail store in the nation. 
And even if they could and did, and obtained injunctions against all present 
violators, this would not stop the counterfeiting. Other infringers would spring up, 
and would continue infringing until enjoined.”); cf. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 
334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that suing individual copyright 
infringers is impractical and futile in the face of voluminous music file sharing over 
the Internet). 
78 955 F.2d 1143, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1992). 
79 Id. at 1145. 
80 Id. at 1148–49. 
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the Inwood standard should apply.81  As such, a flea market 
operator would be liable if he knew or had reason to know that 
the vendor was selling counterfeit merchandise.82  Additionally, 
the court recognized that “willful blindness” could satisfy the 
actual knowledge requirement for the purposes of the Lanham 
Act.83  “Willful blindness” is when a party, such as a flea market 
operator, “suspect[s] wrongdoing” on his or her premises “and 
deliberately fail[s] to investigate.”84   
The reasoning in Hard Rock Café was followed in Fonovisa, 
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,85 which presented a similar set of 
facts.  In Fonovisa, a trademark owner of sound recordings sued 
a flea market operator because a vendor sold counterfeit 
recordings on the premises.86  The flea market operator was 
liable for contributory trademark infringement because he knew 
of the vendor’s past infringing activities at the flea market, yet 
failed to take action against the vendor to stop the 
infringement.87  This holding emphasizes that a third party can 
be liable when it provides the means through which trademark 
infringement occurs, even if the third party is not directly 
responsible for the infringement itself.88  Fonovisa reiterated this 
point:  A party can be liable for contributory trademark 
infringement if it “continues to supply a product knowing that 
the recipient is using the product to engage in trademark 
infringement.”89 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.90 further 
extended the Inwood standard by applying it to Internet service 
providers.  Noting that Hard Rock and Fonovisa allowed courts 
to consider the extent of the defendant’s control over the direct 
infringer when there was no “product” for the purposes of the 
Inwood test, the Lockheed court concluded that a service provider 
can be liable if it has “[d]irect control and monitoring of the 
 
81 Id. at 1148. 
82 See id. at 1149. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
86 Id. at 260. 
87 Id. at 265. 
88 See id. at 264; see also Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1148; Polo Ralph Lauren 
Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
89 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
90 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s 
mark[s].”91  In Lockheed, Lockheed sued Network Solutions after 
learning that third parties registered domain names 
substantially similar to Lockheed’s service mark, “skunk 
works.”92  However, Network Solutions was not liable because the 
service it provided—registering domain names—did not satisfy 
“[t]he ‘direct control and monitoring’ rule established by Hard 
Rock and Fonovisa.”93   
A series of cases following Lockheed illustrate the challenges 
of suing e-commerce sites under the current contributory 
trademark infringement standard to fight counterfeiting on the 
Internet.  One issue is deciding where the service provider falls 
in the spectrum of specific knowledge or willful blindness on one 
end, and generalized knowledge on the other.94  Another issue is 
deciding how closely related the service provider is in its 
involvement with direct infringement.95  Yet another issue is how 
much an online service provider can be expected to do to prevent 
or combat infringement on its website.96  As the following eBay 
cases demonstrate, online auction sites fall somewhere in the 
middle on each spectrum, which has lead to inconsistent 
decisions that add layers of difficulty for policing trademarks. 
 
91 Id. at 984. 
92 Id. at 983 (listing the domain-name combinations at issue,  
including skunkworks.com, skunkworks.net, skunkwrks.com, skunkwerks.com, 
skunkworx.com, and theskunkworks.com). 
93 Id. at 985. 
94 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1188 
(C.D. Cal. 2002); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. 
Supp. 2d 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (likening defendant ISPs to the flea market 
operators in Fonovisa and deciding that defendant ISPs were willfully blind because 
they did not take steps to terminate infringing activity, despite their ability to). 
95 See Akanoc, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (by “physically host[ing] websites on 
their servers and rout[ing] internet traffic to and from those websites,” defendants 
were more closely involved in the infringement than the defendant in Lockheed, who 
“merely provided a ‘rote translation service’ ”). 
96 See Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (Defendant was like the flea market in 
Fonovisa, and “ha[d] the right to terminate webmasters at will, [control] consumer 
access, and promote[] its services.” Defendant also had “detailed policing of sites.” 
With these activities, there was “a strong likelihood of success for” the argument 
that defendant had sufficient control over the infringing websites.); see also 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 962 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (defendant’s involvement with potentially infringing uses of domain names 
was too remote to extend contributory liability, “absent a showing that [the 
defendant domain name registrar] had unequivocal knowledge that a domain name 
was being used to infringe a trademark”), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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II. THE EBAY CASES: OPPOSITE APPROACHES TO CONTRIBUTORY 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT ON ONLINE AUCTION SITES 
In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,97 the Second Circuit 
extended the principles of Inwood and its progeny to include 
online auction sites.  When Tiffany discovered that a substantial 
amount of counterfeit products were being sold on eBay,98 Tiffany 
tried to sue eBay for contributory trademark infringement but 
failed.99  But when Hermes and Louis Vuitton Malletier sued 
eBay in France for the same reasons that Tiffany did, under a 
theory of contributory trademark infringement similar to the 
United States’, they were successful.100  Together, these cases 
present both sides of an underlying issue:  What, if anything, 
should be required of online marketplaces in the fight against 
counterfeiting? 
A. The American Approach: Tiffany v. eBay 
1. The Facts of Tiffany v. eBay 
Tiffany & Co., founded in 1837, is a widely recognized luxury 
brand firm that describes itself as “the world’s premier jeweler 
and America’s house of design.”101  Tiffany places its 
 
97 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 647 (2010). Tiffany was the first American case dealing with contributory 
trademark infringement in the context of online auction sites. Id. at 105. 
98 Id. at 97. The parties disagreed on the amount of counterfeit Tiffany products 
that were actually being sold. After conducting its own survey in 2004 and 2005, 
Tiffany concluded that 73.1% and 75.5% of purported Tiffany merchandise was 
counterfeit. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010). Although the district court below found that Tiffany’s surveys were 
“methodologically flawed and of questionable value,” id. at 512, the court agreed that 
a “significant portion” of Tiffany sterling jewelry listed on eBay was counterfeit, id. 
at 486, and that eBay knew “that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its 
website might be counterfeit.” Id. at 507.  
99 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103. Tiffany also sued eBay for direct trademark 
infringement and false advertising. Id. at 96. The Second Circuit dismissed Tiffany’s 
direct trademark infringement claim, but remanded the case for the false 
advertising claim. Id. at 114. On remand, the Southern District dismissed the false 
advertising claim. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4607(RJS), 2010 WL 
3733894, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010). A discussion of these two causes of actions 
falls outside the scope of this Note.  
100 See Kate Goldwasser, Knock it Off: An Analysis of Trademark Counterfeit 
Goods Regulation in the United States, France, and Belgium, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 207, 222 (2010). 
101 TIFFANY & CO., http://www.tiffany.com/about (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
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“indisputably famous” mark on the high-end lines of jewelry, 
watches, and home goods it designs.102  The value of Tiffany’s 
mark results from over one hundred years of building a 
reputation for excellent quality.103  To maintain the integrity of 
the Tiffany brand, Tiffany conducts strict quality checks and sells 
products only through authorized channels.104  eBay is not one of 
these channels.105 
eBay, one of the largest online auction sites, allows people 
from all over the world to buy from and sell to each other 
practically any kind and number of items.106  There are over one 
hundred million listings worldwide on eBay at any given time in 
over 50,000 different categories.107  In 2010, the total value of 
items sold on eBay’s websites was $62 billion.108  Registering and 
navigating eBay is simple.109  But eBay does require its users to 
agree to its User Agreement, under which users agree to comply 
with applicable laws and refrain from selling prohibited items, 
including counterfeits.110  Sellers can list one or multiple items.111  
Buyers can peruse as many listings as they want and search 
items based on keyword or category.112  Buyers and sellers 
communicate directly with each other on eBay’s website,113 and 
eBay never physically possesses the items for sale.114  eBay 
generates profits by charging sellers a fixed fee for their use of 
eBay’s services and by collecting a commission at the close of 
each sale.115  
 
102 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 471. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 472–73 (authorized channels are Tiffany’s retail stores, catalogs, 
website, and Corporate Sales Department). 
105 See Tiffany & Co., EBAY, http://cgi3.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll? 
ViewUserPage&userid=tiffanytrademark2 (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
106 Who we Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
107 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 647 (2010). 
108 Who we Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). 
109 To register, users provide their name, address, and a banking or checking 
account. Users are also asked to provide a unique username and password. 
110 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Your User Aregeement, 
EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html (last visited Sept. 25, 
2012). 
111 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 474. 
112 Id. at 474–75. 
113 Id. at 475.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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Both Tiffany and eBay devote substantial resources to 
combat counterfeiting.  Tiffany has budgeted over $14 million to 
anti-counterfeiting.116  Prior to this lawsuit, Tiffany attacked 
sellers on eBay for counterfeiting, and conducted numerous 
“enforcement actions” like customs seizures.117  Employees spent 
172 to 240 man-hours per month monitoring eBay and reporting 
listings of counterfeit items to eBay.118  Starting in 2006, Tiffany 
began to “patrol eBay and report violations on a daily basis.”119  
On the other side of the equation, eBay was spending $20 million 
each year and devoting about twenty-five percent of its 
employees to fight counterfeiting on the website.120  eBay had 
various departments and programs to address counterfeiting on 
its website.121  Tiffany was a frequent user of these services. 
One of eBay’s major anti-counterfeiting measures was its 
VeRO program, which puts in place a mechanism very similar to 
the notice-and-takedown scheme used in copyright infringement 
cases, codified in § 512(c) of the DMCA.122  Section 512(c) limits 
liability for online “service providers,”123 provided that the service 
satisfies certain requirements, including a prompt takedown of 
infringing material once notice has been given.124  Under the 
VeRO program, a trademark owner like Tiffany could report a 
particular listing using a Notice of Claimed Infringement 
(“NOCI”) form.125  Should a trademark owner like Tiffany find 
specific instances of counterfeit merchandise being sold on eBay, 
the trademark owner would submit a NOCI.126  Upon receiving 
 
116 Id. at 484. 
117 Id. at 481. 
118 Id. at 484. 
119 Id. The court, however, recognized that Tiffany could have made a greater 
effort to fight counterfeiting. Id. at 485. Tiffany did not develop its own process to 
hasten its monitoring and reporting to eBay, so Tiffany simply could not keep up 
with the listings. Id. at 484–85. Neither did Tiffany take eBay’s suggestion to use 
online reputation management services. Id. at 484. 
120 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 647 (2010); Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 476. 
121 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 476, 479, 489, 491 (eBay’s partnership with 
PayPal to set up “buyer protection programs”; eBay’s “Trust and Safety” department, 
which was 4,000 employees strong; warning messages when users listed Tiffany 
items, prompting the seller to ensure that the item was authentic; “threestrikes” 
rule).  
122 See infra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. 
123 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).  
124 Id.  
125 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478.  
126 Id. 
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this, eBay would remove the listing.127  eBay’s practice was to 
investigate and remove the illicit listings within twenty-four 
hours of receiving a NOCI.128 
2. The Second Circuit’s Decision 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit applied the Inwood test and 
dismissed Tiffany’s contributory trademark infringement 
claim.129  Since eBay provided a service and not a product, the 
issue was whether eBay had the requisite quantum of knowledge 
to trigger liability for contributory trademark infringement.130  
Tiffany provided data131 and expert testimony132 to show that 
eBay had “generalized knowledge” that a significant amount of 
counterfeit Tiffany items were being sold on its website, making 
eBay secondarily liable for the infringing activities.133  However, 
the court held that generalized knowledge was insufficient to 
hold eBay liable for contributory trademark infringement 
because Inwood required specific knowledge or willful 
blindness.134  For example, if eBay had known of particular 
instances of trademark infringement but failed to react, Inwood’s 
specific knowledge prong would be met.  Also, if eBay was aware 
of infringement on its website but refused to respond, Inwood’s 
willful blindness prong would be met.  In this case, eBay had 
neither:  Tiffany did not raise any instance in which eBay had 
specific knowledge of infringement,135 and with strong anti-
counterfeiting tools like VeRO, it could not be said that eBay was  
 
 
 
127 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
128 Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478. In most situations, eBay removed such 
listings within twelve hours. Id.  
129 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 105–07. 
130 Id. at 107. On appeal, eBay dropped its argument that it was not subject to 
Inwood, leading the Second Circuit to assume that Inwood applied. Id. at 105–06 
(citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982)). 
131 Id. at 97–98. 
132 See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 27–28, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv), 2008 WL 8430999, at *15–16. 
133 See Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3947-cv), 2008 WL 8595304, at *4. 
134 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109–10. 
135 Id. at 109. 
WF_de Chavez (Do Not Delete) 12/3/2012  12:39 PM 
266 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:249   
willfully blind.136  eBay was not liable for contributory trademark 
infringement for the counterfeiting that Tiffany found on the 
website.137 
B. The French Approach: Hermes and Louis Vuitton Malletier 
eBay did not fare as well in two lawsuits in France that were 
decided shortly before Tiffany ended.138  Under a similar set of 
facts, eBay was found liable for contributory trademark 
infringement.  The French courts had a different view on 
whether eBay’s level of knowledge could trigger liability, which 
depended on the courts’ interpretations of whether eBay was an 
active participant in transactions on its website or a passive 
venue provider for third-party transactions.  
In the first case, Hermes v. eBay, Hermes sued eBay after 
discovering that an eBay user sold counterfeit products bearing a 
counterfeit Hermes mark.139  Hermes sued eBay in France, 
seeking to hold eBay jointly liable for the infringement.140  
Section 6.1.2 of France’s On-Line Trade Confidence Act of 2004, 
which complements Article L713-2 of the French Intellectual 
Property Code,141 uses a test similar to that from Inwood:  A 
party is liable for contributory infringement if they knew of, yet 
failed to remove infringing merchandise from the “on-line 
communication services” geared toward public use.142  But unlike 
the Second Circuit, the Hermes court did not construe the statute 
in eBay’s favor.143  If the Hermes court had considered eBay a 
“hosting site,” then it would not have been liable for 
counterfeiting on the website.144  Instead, the court considered 
eBay an active provider of tools and services, helping sellers to 
publish their items, communicate with other users, and facilitate 
monetary transactions.145  Because of its substantial role in 
 
136 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
137 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109. 
138 Id. at 105 n.9. 
139 See Hermes case, supra note 32, at 1. 
140 Id. 
141 Goldwasser, supra note 100, at 221. 
142 See Hermes case, supra note 32, at 14. 
143 Id. at 17. 
144 Id. at 15. 
145 Id. (“eBay companies provide tools, permitting to market the sold goods to the 
sellers, organize object presentation on their site . . . [and] communication services 
for intermediation purposes”). 
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facilitating these online exchanges—including illicit sales of 
counterfeit items—eBay was responsible for policing its own site 
for illegal activity.146  As a service provider, eBay had the burden 
of implementing effective anti-counterfeiting measures, such as 
requiring sellers to provide an item’s serial number, type 
number, or certificate of authenticity.147 
This reasoning was confirmed by LVMH, a case decided 
three weeks after Hermes.148  As in the Hermes and Tiffany cases, 
Louis Vuitton Malletier sued eBay after finding that counterfeit 
merchandise was being sold from its website.149  The court viewed 
eBay as a “brokerage site” under Section 6.1.2, not a “mere 
hoster.”150  eBay was a “mandatory player in sales taking place 
on its sites,” playing “a very active role, particularly through 
commercial reminders, in order to increase the number of 
transactions.”151  Furthermore, eBay derived profits from 
engaging in commercial activities, and, “by its very nature, [did] 
not imply lack of knowledge and control of the information 
transmitted on its sites.”152  Like the Hermes court, the LVMH 
court found eBay’s VeRO program an insufficient means to 
combat counterfeiting on its website.153  The court declared that 
eBay should have taken preemptive steps such as requiring 
sellers to provide a certificate of authenticity.154  
III. WHY ONLINE MARKETPLACES SHOULD DO MORE TO PREVENT 
COUNTERFEITING 
In evaluating the decisions of the Second Circuit and the 
French courts, it is important to keep in mind the overarching 
goals of trademark law: to encourage healthy competition in the 
marketplace by (1) protecting consumers, (2) preventing 
confusion regarding the origin of a particular product, and 
(3) encouraging trademark holders’ investments in quality goods 
and services.155  The Second Circuit and the French courts used 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 16. 
148 See LVMH case, supra note 33, at 12. 
149 Id. at 10. 
150 Id. at 10–11. 
151 Id. at 11. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 12. 
154 Id. 
155 See supra Part I.A. 
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similar standards for contributory trademark infringement but 
arrived at opposite conclusions about eBay’s level of knowledge.  
This led to different evaluations of how many steps eBay should 
be expected to take to satisfy its role in combating trademark 
infringement online.  With each approach, there are pros and 
cons for trademark owners and online marketplaces.   
The Second Circuit’s decision, which favors online 
marketplaces, reflects an appreciation for how the Internet made 
possible a booming e-commerce industry.156  Certainly, the court 
recognized the value of eBay’s business model—and similar e-
commerce models—and wished to avoid interfering with it.157  
eBay and other similar sites give consumers more options, which 
is an incentive for trademark owners to create more quality 
products and maintain their reputation.  American courts do not 
want to impose duties on these businesses that would be so costly 
or inefficient so as to cripple valuable businesses like eBay.158  On 
some level, a DMCA-style notice-and-takedown procedure as 
implemented by VeRO is an important step to help trademark 
owners police their brand.159  The knowledge requirement, 
however, is very difficult to meet, which hinders a trademark 
owner’s efforts to protect its mark.160  
On the other hand, the French courts’ decision favors 
trademark owners.  Instead of an appreciation for how the 
Internet allowed the prosperous development of e-commerce, the 
French courts emphasized how the Internet endangered 
legitimate business by “foster[ing] the marketing of fraudulent 
products, among them those that are the result of infringement, 
that scourge of the legal economy.”161  The LVMH court was 
particularly unimpressed with eBay’s motto that “anyone, 
anywhere and at any time, [could] offer, sell or buy practically 
anything he or she wishes,”162 including counterfeiters.  
 
156 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).  
157 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 34, at 526.  
158 Emily Favre, Note, Online Auction Houses: How Trademark Owners Protect 
Brand Integrity Against Counterfeiting, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 165, 195–96 (2007). 
159 See infra Part IV.A. 
160 Matthew C. Berntsen, Note, Knowledge and Misfeasance: Tiffany v. eBay and 
the Knowledge Requirement of Contributory Trademark Infringement, 16 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 102, 128 (2010) (explaining that Tiffany requires trademark owners to 
prove a very high degree of knowledge, which is difficult to do). 
161 LVMH case, supra note 33, at 9. 
162 Id. at 10. 
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Ultimately, the French courts did not think that eBay’s VeRO 
system was effective.163  Since modern technology allows 
counterfeiters to closely imitate trademarks, a counterfeiter 
could easily circumvent VeRO if no one identifies the replica.  
Failing to implement measures to prevent counterfeiters from 
using the website was tantamount to encouraging the sale of 
counterfeit merchandise, and eBay stood to profit from this.164  
Even though the French courts required sites like eBay to 
implement more preventive measures against counterfeiting, in 
doing so they have forced online auction sites to take more 
responsibility in fighting trademark infringement.165 
The French approach to contributory trademark 
counterfeiting, which requires online marketplaces to do more 
than react to notices of counterfeiting, is consistent with the 
United States’ traditionally aggressive stance against 
counterfeiting.  The current American standard, combined with 
the difficulty of tracking counterfeiters online, enables significant 
amounts of counterfeiting to continue in online marketplaces, 
even if it is a generally known fact that counterfeiting occurs 
there.166  The current American contributory trademark 
infringement standards must adapt accordingly to the special 
challenges posed by online marketplaces.  One way to do this is 
by creating a safe-harbor provision similar to § 512(c) of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which provides incentives for 
online service providers to work with copyright owners by 
promptly removing infringing material posted by third parties on 
their websites.167  Like § 512(c), a trademark safe-harbor 
provision for online marketplaces should require them to meet 
certain standards before they can claim the provision’s protection 
from liability.  eBay’s VeRO program, which was modeled after 
§ 512(c), is an effective reactive mechanism to trademark owners’ 
allegations of counterfeiting—within a reasonable time, eBay can 
take down infringing material while leaving legitimate goods 
posted.  But eBay’s take-down mechanism is not triggered until 
the trademark owner notifies eBay, and the Tiffany decision does 
 
163 Id. at 12; Hermes case, supra note 32, at 16. 
164 See Hermes case, supra note 32, at 14–16. 
165 It is well established that trademark owners are responsible for policing their 
own mark. 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 31:38 (4th ed. 2011). 
166 Goldwasser, supra note 100, at 208–09. 
167 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).  
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not require affirmative anti-counterfeiting action from the online 
marketplace.168  Even though online marketplaces should not 
have the burden of policing anyone’s trademark,169 more should 
be expected from online marketplaces—they derive profit from 
counterfeit sales that go undetected, they solicit second-hand 
sales, and they are in a better position than the trademark 
owners are to regulate who can use their services.  The French 
eBay cases made this point, and it would be prudent for the 
United States to adopt it to some degree, given the United States’ 
strong position against counterfeiting.170  Thus, in addition to a 
reactive take-down mechanism, the proposed trademark safe-
harbor provision would also require online marketplaces to 
implement preventive anti-counterfeiting measures.  These 
should deter would-be counterfeiters from using the website and 
encourage accountability.  Requiring online marketplaces to 
implement both preventive and reactive measures will strike a 
better balance between the rights and duties of both parties171 
and set forth clear expectations from both parties. 
IV. CREATING A SECONDARY TRADEMARK LIABILITY SAFE-
HARBOR PROVISION FOR ONLINE MARKETPLACES 
A. Borrowing from Copyright Law’s Approach to Online 
Infringement 
Because of similarities between the goals of trademark law 
and copyright law, some concepts that have been useful for 
copyright issues on the Internet can address certain trademark 
issues.  Like trademark law, copyright law protects intangible 
property rights.172  Copyright law protects the form of expression 
of an author’s ideas so that the author will not be discouraged 
from investing time and energy in creative endeavors and 
displaying the fruits of his or her creative labor in public.173  As is 
the case in trademark law, the Internet can be a great tool for 
disseminating ideas in the copyright context.  But the Internet 
 
168 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
169 See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 31:38 (4th ed. 2011). 
170 See Goldwasser, supra note 100, at 235–36. 
171 See JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 13, at 17. 
172 See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 30, at 1364–66. 
173 COLIN GOLVAN, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 7 (2007). 
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can make infringement easier, faster, and harder to control.174  In 
a world where technology enables immediate and perfect copies 
of speech to be made and distributed, speakers and authors have 
an interest in being able to exert greater control over their works 
on the Internet.  One response to this problem was the DMCA,175 
which updated the United States Copyright Act to cope with 
issues due to technological advances.176  The law attempts to 
balance two interests: a creator’s right to control the distribution 
and use of their work, and society’s interest in easily accessing 
such valuable contributions on the Internet.177  
The effects of this balancing act can be seen in § 512(c) of the 
DMCA, which contains a safe-harbor provision.  Essentially, an 
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) can limit its liability for 
material on its website that infringes copyright by meeting three 
requirements178: (1) the ISP should not have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the infringing material posted on its 
website, or of circumstances that create an awareness of such 
infringement; (2) the ISP should not receive a financial benefit 
directly attributable to the infringing activity; and (3) should the 
ISP be notified of infringing material on its website, the ISP 
should immediately remove it.179  If the online service provider 
 
174 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998). 
175 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
176 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998). 
177 COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH 145 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen 
eds., 2005). 
178 § 512(c) states:  
(1) In general.—A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, 
or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable 
relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction 
of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider— 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using 
the material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and 
ability to control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
179 Id. 
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satisfies these requirements, it will not be liable for infringement 
by its users.  It strikes a balance between the competing interests 
of the copyright owner and the ISP by forcing both parties to 
work with each other—ISPs are encouraged to set up 
mechanisms to promptly address copyright owners’ allegations of 
infringing material on their websites.180  Since its adoption, the 
DMCA has been tested in courts a number of times and 
followed.181 
Trademark law could benefit from a safe-harbor provision 
similar to § 512(c) because it encourages cooperation between 
trademark owners and online marketplaces.  After Tiffany, a 
trademark law similar to § 512(c) would itemize the specific 
mechanisms that online marketplaces should have in place to 
fight counterfeiting on their sites.  First, a trademark safe-harbor 
provision would keep the knowledge requirement prescribed by 
§ 512(c).  As demonstrated by Inwood and the cases leading up to 
Tiffany, holding service providers liable for infringement that 
they had specific knowledge of, or were willfully blind to, 
encourages them to be diligent and vigilant about trademark 
infringement occurring on their sites.182  The level of knowledge 
required by Tiffany does not allow online marketplaces to look 
the other way if they learn of specific instances of counterfeiting; 
they must address the problem adequately.   
Another feature to borrow directly from § 512(c) is a notice-
and-takedown requirement.  The Second Circuit praised eBay for 
expeditiously removing listings of counterfeit items when they 
were reported.183  The elements of eBay’s VeRO program should 
form the basis of a statutory requirement for online auction sites.  
First, available notice-and-takedown measures should be clear to 
trademark owners and simple to use.  Second, the auction site 
should respond promptly to a good-faith notification of alleged 
infringement on the website with a timely investigation.  With 
 
180 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 
334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing the goal of safe harbors as encouraging 
service providers to do “what it can reasonably be asked to do to prevent the use of 
its service by ‘repeat infringers.’ ” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A))).  
181 See Justin D. Fitzdam, Note, Private Enforcement of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act: Effective Without Government Intervention, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1085, 
1094 (2005). 
182 See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
183 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
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regard to a reasonable time frame to expect a response, Tiffany is 
an appropriate standard.  Third, if there is infringement, the 
auction site should promptly remove the listing.  Such provisions 
would promote communication and cooperation between the 
trademark owner and the website, and set a standard for a 
proper reactionary mechanism.   
B. Tailoring a Safe-Harbor Provision for Trademark Law 
Due to the nature of the harm caused by trademark 
infringement, requiring online marketplaces to implement only a 
notice-and-takedown mechanism like VeRO is not enough.  
Because the window of harm in the case of trademark 
infringement is wider than that of copyright infringement, a safe-
harbor provision like § 512(c) should be modified accordingly.  
For copyright owners, infringement occurs precisely when 
unauthorized copying occurs.  When the unauthorized copies are 
removed or destroyed, there is no more copyright infringement.  
In contrast, the harms caused by trademark infringement do not 
necessarily end with the removal of a listing.  There are two 
examples to illustrate.  First, the concept of pre-sale confusion 
suggests that a trademark owner’s rights are injured, even if a 
consumer decided not to buy it because the replica is less 
appealing than an authentic item, or the item was taken down 
beforehand.184  The unauthorized use of Tiffany’s mark to attract 
a buyer already constitutes harm to the trademark owner.185  
Taking down a listing is also ineffective because some users 
deliberately seek counterfeit goods.186  The sale of counterfeit 
goods creates post-sale confusion, which is also injurious to the 
trademark owner.187  A notice-and-takedown mechanism alone 
cannot adequately address these harms.  The VeRO program still 
leaves the trademark owner with the immensely daunting 
challenge of monitoring eBay listings and assessing the 
authenticity of items being sold.188  Adding to the difficulty is the 
fact that the trademark owner can view the listings only as they 
are accessible to the general public, preventing the owner from 
 
184 See supra Part I.A. 
185 See supra Part I.A. 
186 See supra note 52. Searching for “replica” is easier on some websites than on 
others (for example, on Yahoo! and not eBay). 
187 See supra Part I.A. 
188 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 99. 
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making initial assessments of the item before it is listed.189  
Tiffany suggests that, for a significant number of counterfeit 
listings, a trademark owner would never get to those listings that 
are offered for a relatively short window of time, or even instant 
sale.190  In such a case, they could not even avail themselves of 
services like VeRO.   
To address this problem, the proposed safe-harbor legislation 
should also require online marketplaces to implement preventive 
anti-counterfeiting measures that deter people from using the 
website to sell counterfeit merchandise.  Online marketplaces 
should screen users more rigorously191 and  require those selling 
luxury brand goods to attest to its authenticity.  Besides having a 
deterrent effect, such measures would encourage accountability 
from both the seller and the online marketplace.  Together, these 
measures would do away with some of the online anonymity that 
counterfeiters hide behind.  For instance, before allowing users to 
list luxury, name-brand items, eBay could require users to 
provide a certificate of authenticity for sales of brand-name 
goods, or a notarized letter attesting to the product’s 
authenticity.  Another possibility is to work together with 
reputable credit card or other payment services to implement 
stricter sign-up requirements that include a credit check.192  
Depending on the available technology, the online marketplace 
should have some freedom in designing preventive anti-
counterfeiting measures.  The bottom line is that a more effective 
standard193 for online marketplaces for contributory trademark 
infringement would include both preventive and reactive anti-
counterfeiting components. 
 
189 James Ciula, What Do They Know? Actual Knowledge, Sufficient Knowledge, 
Specific Knowledge, General Knowledge: An Analysis of Contributory Trademark 
Infringement Considering Tiffany v. eBay, 50 IDEA 129, 140 (2009). 
190 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010); 
see also Steven Seidenberg, Mark Trail: Online Companies Get a Bye on Using 
Trademarks, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 2010, available at http://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/mark_trail/. 
191 In her Note, Fara Sunderji suggested a statutory scheme imposing a “duty to 
monitor” on online auction sites. Sunderji, supra note 76, at 943–44. This Note’s 
suggestions for other ways to create an effective trademark safe-harbor provision are 
based on a different perspective of the theories underpinning trademark law. 
192 Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud Should Be 
Regulated, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 575, 606 (2002). 
193 See Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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CONCLUSION 
Counterfeiting is dangerous on many levels, and so it should 
be dealt with as seriously online as it is offline.  A more effective 
way to do so is to implement an anti-counterfeiting scheme that 
has preventive and reactive elements.  The current contributory 
trademark infringement standard set forth in Tiffany is deficient 
because it requires only reactive mechanisms from online 
marketplaces, making it very difficult for trademark owners to 
seek redress for infringement online.  And in the case of the most 
successful online marketplaces—which attract sellers of both 
authentic and counterfeit items—trademark owners will have a 
hard time proving that the defendant had “specific knowledge” of 
counterfeiting.194  Worsening the problem is the added difficulty 
of detecting and addressing online counterfeiting, thanks to the 
speed, reach, and anonymity of the Internet.  eBay’s VeRO 
program is a powerful tool and a good model for similar sites.  
Such a mechanism should be required for online marketplaces to 
take advantage of a trademark safe-harbor statute.  Take-down 
mechanisms like eBay’s VeRO program, however, do not address 
all the harms to trademark owners and consumers.  Such 
mechanisms are never triggered if nobody detects the 
counterfeiting.  While it is true that trademark owners, rather 
than online marketplaces, are ultimately responsible for policing 
their brand, online marketplaces are in a better position to find 
more effective ways to combat counterfeiting because of their 
greater expertise and access to the virtual marketplace.  
Trademark law can benefit from a statutory safe-harbor 
provision like the DMCA.  Just as the DMCA did for copyright 
law, an analogous trademark safe-harbor statute would 
encourage online marketplaces to set up effective anti-
counterfeiting measures.  This would also encourage a better 
balance between the duties of trademark owners and those of 
online marketplaces.  Given how large the counterfeiting problem 
is, the burden of enforcing trademark rights is too much for only 
one party to bear. 
 
 
194 See Berntsen, supra note 160. 
